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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2009, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in a case that 
could have severely limited the availability of causes of action against fed-
eral agents who, in their capacity as government actors, violate the consti-
tutional rights of individuals. 
The case, known as Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 arose in the aftermath of the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.2  The suit was brought by a man named 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.B.A., 2007, University of 
Georgia.  I would like to thank Professor Ian Weinstein for inspiring and advising this Note 
and Professors Michael M. Martin and John Pfaff for their valuable input and review.  I 
would also like to thank those close to me for their support and encouragement throughout 
the Note-writing process. 
 1. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan, who was arrested on charges of fraud 
related “to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United 
States.”3  Iqbal was designated as a person “of high interest” and was 
placed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit of the Met-
ropolitan Detention Center (MDC).4 
Iqbal pled guilty to the criminal charges and was deported to Pakistan 
where he filed charges against thirty-four current and former federal offi-
cials.5  Focusing on his treatment at the MDC, Iqbal alleged violations of 
his constitutional rights.6  Specifically, Iqbal alleged that he was designated 
as a person of high interest because of his race, religion, or national origin, 
in violation of his First and Fifth Amendment rights.7  Among the federal 
officials named as defendants by Iqbal were Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) Director Robert Mueller and United States Attorney General 
John Ashcroft.8  Iqbal alleged that “‘each [defendant] knew of, condoned, 
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’ [him] to harsh conditions 
of confinement ‘. . . solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or nation-
al origin and for no legitimate penological interest.’”9  Ashcroft and Muel-
ler moved to dismiss for failure to state sufficient allegations to show their 
involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct.10  The district 
court denied this motion.11 
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Iqbal failed to state a 
cause of action under the standard set forth in the recently decided case Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.12  The Court remanded the case, which afforded 
Iqbal the opportunity to amend his complaint.13 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1943. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1943-44. 
 7. Id. at 1944. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. (quoting First Amended Complaint at 172a-173a, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 
04-CV-1809(JG)(SMG), 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)) (third alteration in original). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that in order to meet the pleading requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the “no set of facts” standard established in Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), is an insufficient protection against disruptive discovery and 
that a plaintiff must plead enough facts to show that he is entitled to relief). 
 13. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
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It was significant to the outcome of this case that Iqbal was forced to re-
ly solely on an implied cause of action, known as a Bivens cause of action, 
rather than a claim sanctioned by Congress through statute.14 
This Note examines the propriety of a statutory replacement for the Bi-
vens action.  Part I of this Note outlines the history of implied causes of ac-
tion generally, including the shifting attitude of the Court toward its power 
to fill gaps through the use of implied causes of action, as well as the 
Court’s attitude toward the Bivens action specifically.  Part II examines the 
arguments for and against the adoption of a statutory replacement for Bi-
vens in the context of the United States post-9/11.  Part III contemplates a 
statutory replacement for Bivens, which would strike a balance between de-
terring rogue government individuals and protecting government officials 
who violate constitutional rights in the good faith execution of their jobs. 
I.  THE SHIFTING ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TOWARD BIVENS 
A. The History of Bivens 
Implied causes of action are judicially-created causes of action that fill 
gaps where the legislature has not acted, but the court infers that a remedy 
exists to redress the particular harm at issue.15  Although “[t]here is no fed-
eral general common law,”16 federal courts still have common law-making 
powers in specific areas, including the gap-filling function provided by im-
plied causes of action.17  Implied causes of action were used frequently by 
the Warren Court and continued to be favored during the years immediately 
following Chief Justice Warren’s retirement,18 when the Court decided Bi-
vens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.19 
 
 14. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.  In the opening portion of its opinion, 
the Iqbal majority explicitly stated that implied causes of action are disfavored. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. at 1948.  This signified the disadvantage Iqbal faced by having to bring an implied 
cause of action rather than a statutory cause of action. 
 15. See David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied 
Cause of Action Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens 
Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683, 683 (1985). 
 16. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 17. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1639, 1643 (2008) (“Justice Jackson famously defended this sort of interstitial law-
making by contending that ‘[w]ere we bereft of the common law, our federal system would 
be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory 
codes . . . .’” (quoting D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, 
J., concurring))). 
 18. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Puts Ideology Aside in Deciding a Small 
But Important Ohio Election Case that Could Affect the 2008 Presidential Election, FIN-
DLAW (Oct. 21, 2008), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20081021.html (noting that the 
Warren Court freely implied causes of action and viewed this gap-filling function as a duty 
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The Supreme Court in Bivens implied a cause of action that made mone-
tary damages an available remedy for a federal official’s violation of an in-
dividual’s Fourth Amendment rights, even though the Constitution itself 
does not specifically provide for such a remedy.20  The Court had consi-
dered a similar situation twenty-five years earlier in Bell v. Hood,21 where a 
claim was made that federal investigators violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights of an individual.22  The Court held that general jurisdic-
tion gave federal courts the power to use “any available remedy” to correct 
the violation of a constitutional right.23  The Court did not, however, an-
swer the question of whether a federal court could find an implied right to 
damages as a remedy under the Constitution.24  In 1971, the Bivens Court 
picked up where Hood left off. 
The majority in Bivens noted that, although “the Fourth Amendment 
does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of 
money damages,” it is “well settled that where legal rights have been in-
vaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such in-
vasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the 
wrong done.”25  The majority went on to conclude that because there were 
“no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative ac-
tion by Congress,” the remedy could be granted by the Court.26 
In citing potential special factors that would counsel hesitation, the 
Court implied that it did not fully embrace the Bivens decision as one rest-
ing purely on a right arising out of the Constitution.27  The Court’s failure 
to identify the specific legal grounds on which Bivens stands has created 
the issue of how to reconcile the overlapping powers of the judiciary and 
 
of the Court); see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (stating that “[i]t is 
for the federal courts ‘to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief’ where fed-
erally secured rights are invaded” (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 687, 684 (1946))). 
 19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 20. Id. at 395-96. 
 21. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
 22. Id. at 679. 
 23. Id. at 684. 
 24. Id. at 684-85. 
 25. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 26. Id.  The “special factors counseling hesitation” language was important in later cases 
when the Court determined that where Congress has acted by providing any remedy, even a 
remedy not as effective as Bivens, Bivens may not be extended. See infra notes 56-58 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. See generally George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—
Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 (1989) (arguing that the Court 
could have resolved the issue using a more straightforward analysis). 
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the legislature with regard to remedies for constitutional violations.28  As 
this Note later discusses, the failure of the Court to take a firm stance on its 
power to create federal common law in this area has given the current 
Court ammunition with which to limit Bivens remedies.29 
In his dissent from the Bivens majority, Chief Justice Burger took the 
unusual step of expressly calling upon Congress to create a statute akin to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983,30 which would grant a statutory cause of action for dam-
ages against federal officials who violate an individual’s constitutional 
rights.31  Justice Burger’s recommendation of a statute to replace Bivens 
made clear that he agreed with the majority that the cause of action should 
exist.  Nevertheless, he disagreed over whether the Court had the power to 
judicially create the Bivens cause of action, believing that the Court’s ac-
tion was a violation of the separation of powers.32 
In addition to the majority and dissenting opinions, Justice Harlan filed a 
separate concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority that 
granting a cause of action for damages was the appropriate response be-
cause “[f]or people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”33  Read lit-
erally, this statement implies that a plaintiff can only succeed on a Bivens 
claim if damages are the only possible remedy for the specific situation at 
issue before the court.34  This type of analysis, combined with the “special 
factors” language found in the majority’s opinion, has also fueled the cur-
rent Court’s narrow interpretation of Bivens.35 
 
 28. Id.  Professor Brown argues that the Bivens Court could have reasoned, in a 
straightforward way, “that the plaintiff asserted a right under the Constitution, that the fed-
eral courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, and thus, that they 
have the power and the duty to award damages if a compensable violation of constitutional 
rights is shown.” Id. at 269.  This analysis would not have required the “special factors” 
language which has recently been used by the current Court to strike down Bivens claims. 
See infra Part I.B. 
 29. See infra Part I.B. 
 30. Section 1983 grants a statutory cause of action for damages against state or local 
actors by providing in part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 31. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412, 422-23 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 27, at 267 (explaining that the dissent viewed the 
creation of the Bivens remedy as truly a legislative task and only Congress could create this 
type of cause of action). 
 33. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 34. See Nutter, supra note 15, at 691. 
 35. See id. at 694-95 (stating that the Court has adopted the “Damages or Nothing Ap-
proach” in analyzing Bivens claims, which requires damages to be the only potential reme-
dy, and thus significantly restricts the availability of Bivens awards). 
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Despite Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion, Congress did not act 
to replace Bivens.  The cause of action was embraced by the Court and en-
joyed a decade of expansion, exemplified by the Court’s decisions in Davis 
v. Passman,36 where the Court extended the Bivens cause of action to Fifth 
Amendment claims, and Carlson v. Green,37 where the Court extended Bi-
vens to the Eighth Amendment.  Lower courts also adopted the rationale of 
the majority and extended Bivens causes of action to First38 and Sixth39 
Amendment claims. 
Since the Court’s decision in Bivens, the views of the Bivens majority 
and dissent about the power of the Court to infer causes of action have been 
a central issue of contention with the current Court recently favoring the 
views of the Bivens dissent.40  It is unclear, however, whether the current 
Court strictly rejects its role as gap-filler because of separation of powers 
concerns, or if it only rejects its gap-filler function when it disagrees with 
the policy choice of the law in question.  Bivens provides an example of a 
controversial policy choice in the eyes of the Court.  Causes of action for 
damages against federal agents, and the government more generally, tend 
to be disfavored by certain political constituencies.41  If the current Court 
sympathizes with those sentiments, there might be an alternative reason for 
its resistance to extensions of Bivens.42 
Although it is unlikely that the Court will ever spell out its motivations 
entirely, there are some commentators who blatantly state that whether or 
not causes of action like Bivens are favored depends on the political lean-
ings of the Court.43  A popular legal blogger articulates the issue plainly: 
Conservatives hate Bivens.  Liberals love it.  There are fantastic argu-
ments for love and hate.  Some conservatives say that Article III courts 
lack the power to create common-law causes of action.  Plus, conserva-
tives, as a matter of realpolitik, don’t like lawsuits against the police.  On 
the former point, liberals say that’s silly: There is indeed a substantial 
 
 36. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 37. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 38. See, e.g., McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536 (6th Cir. 1996); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 
F.3d 789, 794 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
 39. Wounded Knee Legal Def./Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 40. See infra Part I.B. 
 41. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Supervisory Liability Under Bivens and Section 1983, CRIME 
& FEDERALISM (July 26, 2009), http://federalism.typepad.com/crime_federalism/2009/07/ 
ashcroft-v-iqbal-supervisory-liability-under-bivens.html [hereinafter CRIME & FEDERALISM] 
(stating that causes of action against the government are disfavored by conservatives). 
 42. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., CRIME & FEDERALISM, supra note 41. 
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body of federal common law.  On the latter point, liberals say nothing.  
Pointing out conservative’s pro-government bias is bad manners.44 
Regardless of the reason, whether it is the Court’s perception of the limita-
tions of its power, or its distaste for causes of action against the govern-
ment, it is clear that the current Court disfavors Bivens.45 
The next portion of this Note discusses the current Court’s view of Bi-
vens more thoroughly, including how sections of the majority and concur-
ring opinions of Bivens have recently been used by the Court to limit the 
Bivens cause of action. 
B. The Current Court’s Attitude Toward Bivens 
Implied causes of action are now explicitly disfavored by the Supreme 
Court.46  Some believe that Bivens is treated as a matter of discretionary re-
lief that can be cut back at the Court’s will, rather than a decision that binds 
the Court through stare decisis.47  Ironically, the primary reasons that the 
Court has given for declining to extend Bivens stem from the Bivens major-
ity and concurring opinions.48 
The Bivens majority indicated that there were two potential exceptions to 
the extension of the cause of action.49  The first exception provides that a 
remedy may be available where the case involves “no special factors coun-
seling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”50  The 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See infra Part I.B. 
 46. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (stating that implied causes of 
action are disfavored and the Court is reluctant to extend liability to new categories of de-
fendants).  Although the subject, in its entirety, is beyond the scope of this Note, it is far 
from clear that the Court is correct in analyzing implied causes of action as disfavored when 
compared to statutory causes of action absent congressional action rejecting the judicially 
created cause of action.  In fact, gap-filling has been recognized as an important role for the 
Court, in that it assists the legislature by acknowledging that it is sometimes impossible to 
create all-inclusive statutory codes. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  For more on 
this subject, see Nutter, supra note 15, at 688 n.19, and CRIME & FEDERALISM, supra note 41 
(“[C]onservative justices, when they can, limit Bivens . . . [by writing] opinions which state: 
‘Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bi-
vens liability to any new context or new category of defendants.’” (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1948)). 
 47. See Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal: The Bivens Dicta, DORF ON LAW (May 18, 2009, 3:48 
PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2009/05/iqbal-bivens-dicta.html [hereinafter The Bivens 
Dicta]. 
 48. See Brown, supra note 27, at 273-74 (noting that congressional action providing 
some sort of relief for the complained of conduct is viewed by the current Court as a bar to 
Bivens recovery). 
 49. See id. at 270. 
 50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
396 (1971). 
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second exception, again deferring to Congress, states that “we have here no 
explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from 
the agents.”51  These exceptions suggest that the Court’s power to grant the 
damages remedy is subject to congressional revocation.  Thus, Congress, as 
explained by the Court in Carlson v. Green,52 may preclude damage relief 
in Bivens actions by granting alternative remedies.53 
In Bush v. Lucas,54 the Court declined to extend Bivens liability to a First 
Amendment violation claim where Congress had already developed a com-
prehensive remedy scheme.55  The Bush Court treated the congressional 
remedy as a “special factor[] counseling hesitation,” thus blurring the two 
exceptions into one exception, namely, congressional creation of a reme-
dy.56  The Court in Bush noted that Congress’ consideration of the issue 
meant that this was a case where the wrong would be redressed even with-
out the extension of an implied damages remedy.57  The Court rejected the 
claim that the Bivens remedy must be granted because Congress’ solution 
was not as effective as Bivens.58  Instead, the Court held that the congres-
sional remedy need only be constitutionally adequate,59 and noted that 
Congress was better suited to weigh the costs and benefits of the competing 
policy considerations of remedies.60 
Thus, the Court has taken the position that the relief made available by 
Congress need not be as effective as damages relief provided by Bivens.  
This belief reflects the viewpoint of the “Damages or Nothing Approach” 
of Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, if that language is read literally as a 
requirement to granting Bivens relief.61  Bush also echoes Bivens dissent by 
making the claim that Congress is in a better position than the Court to de-
termine the appropriate remedies for violations of constitutional rights.62  
 
 51. Id. at 397. 
 52. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 53. Id. at 18-19; see also Brown, supra note 27, at 271. 
 54. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 55. Id. at 390. 
 56. Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional Cause of 
Action, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (1988) [hereinafter Bivens Doctrine in Flux]. 
 57. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90. 
 58. Bivens Doctrine in Flux, supra note 56, at 1252. 
 59. Id. (noting that the constitutional adequacy standard leaves open a broad question as 
to whether Congress can replace Bivens remedies by granting remedies that do not provide 
meaningful protection of a plaintiff’s rights). 
 60. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-89. 
 61. See Nutter, supra note 15, at 692. 
 62. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 422 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recommending that Congress, not the Court, 
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Thus, Bush marks the shift of the Court toward both a narrow reading of 
Bivens and an analysis that more closely aligns with the Bivens dissent. 
This shift may be traced to Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Carlson v. 
Green,63 where he encouraged the Court to overrule Bivens, making many 
of the same arguments as the Bivens dissent.64  Rehnquist’s dissent stated 
that Congress’ action to provide a remedy in the area at hand should be 
dispositive because Congress has taken account of competing considera-
tions in striking “what it considers to be an appropriate balance.”65 
There is also evidence that other Justices have shifted their views on im-
plied causes of action generally.  Justice Kennedy, author of Iqbal, which 
expressly stated that implied causes of action are disfavored by the Court,66 
expressed the opposite view in an earlier opinion.67  In Virginia Bank-
shares, Justice Kennedy stated that by improperly attempting to limit im-
plied causes of action, the Court was using “guerrilla warfare to restrict a 
well-established implied right of action.”68  This language acknowledges 
that implied causes of action are not treated with strict stare decisis applica-
tion, and that even well-established implied rights of action are subject to 
improper attack and limitation by the Court.  Ironically, by the time Iqbal 
reached the Court, Justice Kennedy was apparently prepared to use “guer-
rilla warfare” of his own to limit the extension of Bivens.69 
Iqbal presents a new approach by the Court for limiting implied causes 
of action.  As opposed to using one of the Bivens exceptions to reject the 
Bivens claim made by Iqbal, the Court used a procedural rule to limit the 
cause of action at the pleading stage before discovery could occur.70  Spe-
cifically, in Iqbal, the Court extended the pleading standard announced in 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,71 requiring plaintiffs to file a complaint with 
enough factual content, accepted as true, for the court to draw a reasonable 
 
“should develop . . . [a] remedy”), with Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-89 (stating that “Congress is 
in a far better position than a court” to create a remedy). 
 63. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 32, 40-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 51, 53. 
 66. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). 
 67. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
 68. Id. at 1115 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Although the 
implied cause of action at issue in Virginia Bankshares was not a Bivens action, the lan-
guage illustrates the shifting views of members of the Court as to whether or not implied 
causes of action deserve a strict application of stare decisis, or whether, in the alternative, 
the Court is free to use its discretion to grant these actions on a case by case basis. 
 69. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947-48. 
 70. See id. at 1953-54. 
 71. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct.72  This is an argu-
ably stricter standard than the facial requirement of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as Rule 8(a)(2) does not mention anything about alleging 
facts to support a claim, but rather requires the pleader to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted.73  Further, Form 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides a sample complaint for negligence that simply 
states the date and place where the incident occurred, the negligent action 
of the defendant, and the allegation that the negligence resulted in the 
plaintiff’s injury.74  The sample complaint does not include any further fac-
tual matter which would indicate, as the Court suggests in Twombly that it 
should, regardless of whether the defendant is liable for the misconduct.75 
Interpreting Rule 8(a)(2) more strictly is unlikely to have a significant 
effect in most cases because plaintiffs’ lawyers tend to allege specific facts 
in their complaints, regardless of the fact that Rule 8(a)(2) contains no such 
facial requirement.76  Furthermore, in most cases where a pleading is found 
to be insufficient, the court will grant leave to amend the complaint.77  Rule 
8(a)(2) assumes that the party has access to the information needed to satis-
fy the Court’s pleading standard set forth in Twombly without the benefit of 
discovery.  However, in a case like Iqbal, where there is a significant in-
formational asymmetry between the parties, this heightened requirement 
could prove fatal to a plaintiff’s claim as much of the specific factual in-
formation related to defendants like Ashcroft will be inaccessible until the 
discovery stage because it is not a matter of public record.78 
 
 72. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 73. According to Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  Significantly, prior to the Iqbal decision, some scholars argued that Twom-
bly was limited to antitrust cases and the decision did not reinterpret Rule 8(a)(2) generally. 
See Leading Case, Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 310 n.51 (2007). 
 74. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Maxwell S. Kennerly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Not Nearly As Important As You Think, 
LITIGATION & TRIAL (June 29, 2009), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2009/06/articles/ 
the-law/for-lawyers/ashcroft-v-iqbal-not-nearly-as-important-as-you-think/. 
 77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (stating that the court may grant leave for the party to 
amend a complaint and that the court should freely grant this leave when justice requires). 
 78. See Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the 
Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 928 (2010) (arguing that, because of the impos-
sibility of a plaintiff possessing all of the necessary information, cases will be dismissed). 
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C. Given that Bivens is Disfavored, What Options Does the Court or 
Congress Have? 
The fact that the Court has been hostile toward Bivens and other implied 
causes of action begs the question: What is the future of Bivens liability?  
The answer depends heavily on which government branch takes action. 
One possibility is that the Court will continue chipping away at Bivens 
liability, effectively eviscerating it as a cause of action.  By refusing to ex-
tend or expand Bivens liability, individual government employees will be 
effectively immune to suits for violations of constitutional rights.  This in-
demnification would save government resources that otherwise would be 
spent on discovery and defense for government actors.79  The downside, 
however, is that victims would be forced to bear all costs of constitutional 
violations, which some might consider an intolerable outcome. 
Alternatively, the Court could explicitly overturn Bivens.  This would 
make clear that no cause of action allowing recovery of damages exists for 
violations of constitutional rights and all parties would adjust their behavior 
accordingly.  By overturning Bivens, the Court would take a more 
straightforward approach that would send a clearer signal to victims about 
their realistic recovery options.  Further, the explicit lack of a judicial Bi-
vens remedy might put pressure on lawmakers to take action, which the Bi-
vens dissent and the current Court would likely prefer.80 
Finally, even without the Court overturning Bivens, Congress could 
enact a statute creating a cause of action for damages for violations of con-
stitutional rights by government officials.  This would eliminate the uncer-
tainty created by the Court’s broad discretion to grant or deny the cause of 
action and would legitimize the cause of action for those on the Court who 
disfavor either implied causes of action generally or Bivens causes of action 
specifically.81 
This Note recommends that Bivens be codified and replaced by statute.  
The second portion of this Note examines the arguments for and against the 
 
 79. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public 
Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 67 (1999) (noting that, almost 
without exception, the government represents or pays for representation of federal officials 
accused of violating constitutional rights).  Further, the government pays the settlements and 
damages of these actions in most cases. Id.  If Bivens liability were never extended, these 
costs would be avoided. 
 80. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 81. See generally Michael B. Hedrick, Note, New Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Ef-
forts to Replace the Bivens Action with a Statutory Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity of the 
United States for Constitutional Tort Suits, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1055 (2003) (arguing 
that Congress should amend the Federal Tort Claims Act to create a statutory cause of ac-
tion to replace Bivens). 
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adoption of a statute granting a Bivens remedy of monetary damages to in-
dividuals whose constitutional rights are violated by federal officials. 
II.  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A CODIFICATION OF BIVENS 
This section of the Note gives an overview of the arguments that have 
been advanced both in favor of, and against, the adoption of a statute to re-
place Bivens as an implied cause of action in the current, post-9/11 context. 
A. Arguments for Replacing Bivens by Statute 
Proponents of the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens first argue that 
the post-9/11 environment requires that there be certainty as to the availa-
bility of damages against the government and its agents for violations of 
constitutional rights.82  In the wake of 9/11, Congress expanded the federal 
government’s internal security powers, as illustrated by the adoption of the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 
2001.83  The USA PATRIOT Act amended the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act84 to allow the issuance of warrants without a showing of 
probable cause provided the warrant is for a significant intelligence-
gathering purpose.85  The USA PATRIOT Act also allows the government 
to track email and internet usage.86  Through these and other provisions of 
the Act, the federal government has gained the power, once reserved to the 
states, to monitor individuals in a way that potentially implicates constitu-
tional rights.87  By allowing the federal government greater access to indi-
viduals’ information, the USA PATRIOT Act creates a greater likelihood 
of constitutional violations.  These violations must be addressed by Bivens 
 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 1060 (arguing that the 9/11 terrorist attacks redefined the federal 
government’s role in internal security). 
 83. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 84. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 85. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1060 n.49 (stating that before the USA PATRIOT 
Act, the government was required to make a showing of “probable cause that the primary 
purpose of the request was gathering intelligence on a foreign target”). 
 86. See USA PATRIOT Act § 216. 
 87. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1061.  These provisions have potential Fourth 
Amendment implications, as some argue that the USA PATRIOT Act itself sanctions offi-
cial disregard of Fourth Amendment rights. Id.  Further, because of the significant correla-
tion between national origin, race, religion, and those being monitored after the 9/11 attacks, 
Fourteenth Amendment issues could arise. 
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rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which applies only to state officials.88  How-
ever, because the Court currently disfavors implied causes of action, as 
evidenced by the Iqbal decision,89 Bivens may be an inadequate device for 
protecting constitutional rights in the post-Iqbal era.90  For this reason, 
some argue for the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens so that the cause 
of action would no longer be a matter of the Court’s discretion and there 
would be certainty about the availability of relief.91 
A second argument for the adoption of a statute to replace Bivens re-
sponds to the concern that allowing recovery of damages from federal 
agents who violate constitutional rights would create chilling effects that 
would hamper agents’ abilities to perform and be decisive on the job.92  
Proponents of the replacement of Bivens by statute argue that any chilling 
effects created by the statute would be limited to rogue officials and, there-
fore, would not deter federal agents from taking needed action for fear of 
personal liability.93  This argument is based on the assumption that the 
government would continue to allow indemnification unless a violation of 
clearly established law had occurred.94  The chilling effects are thus limited 
to rogue officials, because only rogue agents would be personally responsi-
ble for damages from a violation—all others would be indemnified by the 
government.95  Because this is the exact type of conduct the law intends to 
deter, the chilling effect is an argument for adoption of a statute.  Further, 
because government indemnity is already available under Bivens, new costs 
would not necessarily arise from the creation of a statutory replacement.  In 
fact, if done correctly, the costs to the government and ultimately the tax-
payers could potentially be reduced.96 
 
 88. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 90. An example of the inadequacy of the Bivens remedy is that plaintiffs’ cases will be 
dismissed where the plaintiff lacks the necessary information to meet the new, heightened 
pleading standard. See Kilaru, supra note 78. 
 91. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1063 (noting that a major benefit of a statutory re-
placement for Bivens is the “alleviation of uncertainty regarding the interaction of Bivens 
actions and other congressional schemes”). 
 92. See David L. Noll, Note, Qualified Immunity in Limbo: Rights, Procedure, and the 
Social Costs of Damages Litigation Against Public Officials, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 918-19 
(2008). 
 93. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 77-78. 
 94. Id. at 77. 
 95. Any current chilling effect is limited to uncertainty in the indemnification law, 
which could be limited by statute. See id. 
 96. See discussion infra Part III. 
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Of great concern to the Court in Twombly and Iqbal was the potential for 
non-meritorious claims to cause disruptive discovery for defendants.97  
Another argument for a statute replacing Bivens is that Congress could pro-
vide for limited discovery, as was contemplated by the Second Circuit in 
Iqbal v. Hasty.98  The Second Circuit suggested that limited discovery 
could strike a balance between the qualified immunity defense allowed to 
government officials and the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), 
while also limiting discovery costs for defendants and protecting privileged 
information.99  The majority in Ashcroft v. Iqbal explicitly rejected the 
suggestion of limited discovery through its discretion in allowing Bivens 
cases to proceed.100  However, if a statute replaced Bivens, Congress could 
authorize courts to allow limited discovery before deciding whether cases 
should be dismissed.101 
Finally, proponents of the adoption of a statute to replace the Bivens de-
cision argue that a statute would create needed symmetry between causes 
of action against state and federal officials.102  In contrast with 42 U.S.C. § 
1983,103 which provides a cause of action against state agents who violate 
federal constitutional rights under the color of law,104 Bivens is the only 
cause of action available that provides monetary damages to individuals 
whose constitutional rights are violated by federal agents.  Although initial-
ly there may have been symmetry between Bivens and § 1983 causes of ac-
tion, the disfavored treatment of Bivens by the Court has eliminated that 
symmetry so that individuals whose rights are violated by federal agents 
have fewer remedies than those whose rights are violated by state actors.105  
 
 97. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom-
bly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting that in light of an increasing caseload in federal 
courts, parties should not advance into the discovery stage when there is “no reasonable li-
kelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint” 
(citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984))). 
 98. 490 F.3d 143, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (refusing to allow Iqbal’s complaint to go forward even with 
discovery controls such as in camera review in place, because “the question presented by a 
motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed 
upon the discovery process”). 
 101. This approach was also suggested by Justice Stevens in the Twombly dissent. See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if there is abundant evidence 
that the allegation is untrue, directing that the case be dismissed without even looking at any 
of that evidence marks a fundamental- and unjustified-change in the character of pretrial 
practice.”). 
 102. See Brown, supra note 27, at 265-66. 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 104. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 105. Brown, supra note 27, at 265-66. 
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The Court, in Butz v. Economou,106 compared the two causes of action in 
the context of immunity defenses and determined that it would be impossi-
ble to distinguish “between suits brought against state officials under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against 
federal officials.”107  If it is impossible to distinguish between the officials 
in terms of immunity defenses, why should there be a nearly outcome-
determinative distinction in terms of one’s ability to bring the actions?  
Without the broad judicial discretion enjoyed by the Court under Bivens, 
this outcome-determinative asymmetry could be eliminated. 
B. Arguments Against Replacing Bivens by Statute 
This section describes the arguments advanced against extending liabili-
ty for monetary damages to government officials who violate an individu-
al’s constitutional rights. 
One common argument against extending liability is that the fear of lia-
bility will create a chilling effect that will deter federal agents from taking 
required action in their line of work.108  This argument assumes that gov-
ernment agents fear that if a suit is brought against them they will personal-
ly have to pay damages or legal fees, rather than have the government in-
demnify them for these costs.109  Such fears would disincentivize necessary 
official action where the law is novel or unclear. 
Fear of a “flood of litigation” is another common argument.110  The fear 
is that the creation of a cause of action against government actors who vi-
olate constitutional rights will produce a flood of non-meritorious litigation 
that will clog the court system and impose deadweight losses on the gov-
ernment.111  “Deadweight loss” is an economic term, which describes a sit-
uation in which the outcome is not Pareto optimal.112  The argument is that 
non-meritorious claims produce deadweight loss, which in turn imposes 
costs on society that make society and defendants worse off without mak-
ing anyone better off.113 
 
 106. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 107. Id. at 504. 
 108. See Noll, supra note 92. 
 109. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 78. 
 110. Noll, supra note 92, at 919-20. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 919 n.47 (defining Pareto optimal outcomes as outcomes where a party cannot 
be made better off without making another party worse off).  Under this definition, the chill-
ing effect argument discussed above, supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text, can also 
be understood as a deadweight loss avoidance argument. 
 113. Noll, supra note 92 at 919 n.47. 
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A third argument against extending Bivens liability, advanced by the Iq-
bal majority itself, is that claims against the government can impose costly 
and disruptive discovery.114  Among these costs is the fear that privileged 
or confidential government information could be leaked through the dis-
covery process.115  This leads to a second chilling effect argument, namely, 
that the political decision-making process will be disrupted if government 
agents fear liability for participation in frank discussions that could later be 
discoverable and to which liability could attach.116 
A final argument against adopting a statutory replacement for Bivens 
flows from the recognition that in most cases, the government, and thus the 
taxpayers, bear the ultimate cost of Bivens litigation.117  By denying a cause 
of action against federal officials accused of violating an individual’s con-
stitutional rights, the government is able to save resources that likely would 
have been spent defending against the action and paying damages. 
The next part of this Note advances the arguments in favor of replacing 
Bivens and advocates for the adoption of a statute by Congress.  Part III in-
cludes a discussion of the form that the statute could take in order to 
achieve both efficiency and access to justice.118 
III.  CONGRESS SHOULD ADOPT A STATUTE TO REPLACE BIVENS 
In order to reach the conclusion that Congress should adopt a statute to 
replace Bivens, it is necessary to reexamine some of the arguments against 
statutory replacement. 
The first of these arguments is that granting a cause of action in damages 
against federal agents would have a chilling effect on agents’ actions, 
which sometimes would cause agents to fail to take needed action for fear 
of personal liability.119  Given the current use of government indemnifica-
tion in Bivens cases, the chilling effect argument is unsatisfactory.  Because 
the federal government assumes the costs of defending virtually all Bivens 
 
 114. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
 115. See Noll, supra note 92, at 920. 
 116. See id. at 920-21. 
 117. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 76 (acknowledging that when indemnification occurs, 
it is the taxpayers who foot the bill); see also Noll, supra note 92, at 918 (listing a lawyer’s 
availment of government resources in a Bivens case as a direct cost of the cause of action). 
 118. In advocating for a statutory replacement of Bivens, this Note is not implying that 
Bivens, as a matter of federal common law, stands on inferior ground as compared to con-
gressionally created law.  Rather, this Note acknowledges the current Court’s position on 
Bivens, and argues for statutory replacement to eliminate the current Court’s discretionary 
power to make the cause of action available. 
 119. See Noll, supra note 92. 
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actions,120 the chilling effect on agents would be limited to those few cases 
where indemnification is unavailable.  Indemnification is most commonly 
unavailable when the violation occurs outside of the scope of employment 
or when indemnification is not in the interest of the United States.121  Be-
cause of the very limited scope of personal liability in Bivens cases, the 
chilling effect argument begins to unravel when indemnification is consi-
dered. 
The second argument that must be reexamined posits that the dead-
weight losses flowing from non-meritorious claims create Pareto ineffi-
ciencies, which justify disallowing the cause of action in its entirety.122 
While the filing of non-meritorious claims is clearly inefficient, this ar-
gument views the effects of these non-meritorious claims in a bubble.  It 
would be more useful to analyze the situation using a Kaldor-Hicks, rather 
than Pareto, efficiency measurement.123  Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis 
compares the total costs and benefits of having a cause of action against 
government officials generally available.124  The cost-benefit analysis 
would then compare the aggregate costs imposed (including litigation 
costs, deadweight loss from non-meritorious claims, and any chilling effect 
on government officials)125 with the aggregate benefits realized (including 
deterring constitutional violations, granting a remedy for loss incurred due 
to constitutional violations, and increasing public confidence in a system 
with safeguards against rogue government officials).  This examination and 
weighing of the total costs and benefits is more appropriate than a Pareto 
optimal analysis because of the complexity (or impossibility) of taking any 
widespread government action that makes some better off without making 
anyone worse off. 
 
 120. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 67. 
 121. See id. at 77 & n.56 (“A typical example of a Bivens case in which a public em-
ployee would not be represented and indemnified by the government is one in which the 
employee is under criminal investigation or prosecution by the government for the conduct 
that gave rise to the constitutional tort suit.”). 
 122. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. 
 123. Compare Economic Definition of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY, 
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/Kaldor-Hicks+efficiency (last visited Sept. 12, 
2010) (“A type of efficiency that results if the monetary value of society’s resources are 
maximized.”), with Economic Definition of Pareto Efficiency, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY, 
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/Pareto+efficiency (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) 
(“A type of efficiency that results if one person can not be made better off without making 
someone else worse off.”). 
 124. See Economic Definition of Kaldor-Hicks Improvement, ECONOMIC GLOSSARY, 
http://glossary.econguru.com/economic-term/Kaldor-Hicks+improvement (last visited Sept. 
12, 2010) (“[I]f those gains exceed those losses, or the benefits exceed the costs, then social 
welfare is improved and undertaking the action provides a net benefit to society.”). 
 125. See Noll, supra note 92, at 918-22. 
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The third argument that must be reexamined is the “disruptive discov-
ery” argument, which alleges that the creation of a statutory cause of action 
against federal officials could lead to costly or harmful discovery for de-
fendants.126  As previously discussed, this issue was of particular concern 
to the Court in Twombly and Iqbal.127  Although the Court took the position 
that absent a pleading of specific facts alleging a violation the case must be 
dismissed, it could have adopted a more moderate approach and allowed 
limited discovery.  In fact, the Second Circuit suggested such an approach 
in Iqbal v. Hasty.128  This approach would have balanced the needs of 
plaintiffs alleging violations by high level officials as well as of defendants 
and the court system in limiting costs and protecting privileged and confi-
dential information.  Because much of the specific factual information re-
lated to high level government officials is arguably inaccessible until the 
discovery stage of the proceeding, allowing for limited discovery in the ab-
sence of specific factual pleading ensures that government officials are not 
shielded from liability, and thus provides the more balanced approach. 
Given the inadequacy of the arguments against codifying Bivens, this 
Note argues that Bivens should be replaced by a statute.  This statute should 
provide a cause of action allowing for general damages against federal offi-
cials who violate clearly established laws or invidiously attempt to take ad-
vantage of new or ambiguous laws.  Alternatively, when federal agents, in 
the good faith execution of their duties, violate new or ambiguous laws, the 
government should indemnify the agents and limit damages to pecuniary 
costs for the reasons set forth below. 
A. Where Clearly Established Law has Been Violated, a Cause of 
Action Should be Available Against the Offending Agent 
In determining the form that a statute replacing Bivens should take, it is 
necessary to distinguish between situations where a government agent vi-
olates new or uncertain laws on the one hand, and on the other hand, situa-
tions where a government agent violates clearly established laws, and in so 
doing, causes damage to the victim.  In the latter situation, no indemnifica-
tion of the government should be available to the agent, and the agent 
should pay the full amount of proven damages.129 
Such a rule limits the moral hazard problem that may exist when there is 
an expectation that the government will pay any damages that arise while 
 
 126. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 128. See 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 129. See infra Part III.B. 
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on the job.130  Although some of this moral hazard problem is likely curbed 
by the prospect of negative employment consequences, for example, the 
possibility of losing one’s job for blatant legal violations, the possibility of 
being held personally liable would further curb this problem to the extent 
that internal mechanisms fail.  Granting such a cause of action could also 
strengthen the impact of internal controls because the enforcement of dis-
ciplinary proceedings depends upon the reporting of violations to the ap-
propriate authorities.  A statutory cause of action would give victims great-
er incentive to report abuses, which would in turn increase enforcement of 
internal controls and give them more bite. 
Additionally, where the agent acts upon personal motives and ultimately 
violates the Constitution, it is difficult to argue that the government and the 
taxpayers should be responsible for the cost of this intentional, invidious, 
official misconduct.131  In fact, allowing indemnity in these circumstances 
would mean that taxpayers would actually be subsidizing intentional un-
constitutional conduct, which is clearly contrary to the purpose of indemni-
fication. 
The standard for imposing personal liability on a government official 
must be a violation of clearly established law.  Whether or not a law is 
clearly established is a question of law.132  The clearly established law 
standard is currently used by the Court to determine if qualified immunity 
applies to the offending government official.133  Under the current system, 
if qualified immunity applies, the suit does not move forward and the vic-
tim is left to bear all of the costs attributable to the violation.134  This Note 
 
 130. Moral hazard is a term used by economists to explain why individuals covered by 
insurance engage in greater risk-taking than they would without insurance. See Economics 
A-Z, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/RESEARCH/ECONOMICS/alphabetic.cfm? 
letter=M#moralhazard (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).  In the case of indemnification, the abili-
ty to indemnify the government and escape payment of damages for violations of clearly 
established law functions as insurance for the government agent.  The moral hazard theory 
suggests that because of indemnification, government agents engage in riskier behavior than 
they would if they were expected to pay damages out of their own pockets.  Some argue that 
personal liability is needed to create effective deterrence of unconstitutional behavior. See 
Pillard, supra note 79, at 75 (“If constitutional tort damages are simply a cost of business 
passed on to government, officials might lack sufficient incentive to comply with constitu-
tional commands.”). 
 131. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 76. 
 132. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809(JG)(SMG), 2005 WL 2375202, at *10 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 133. Qualified immunity will bar suit for constitutional violations unless the defendant 
violated “clearly established” law, whereas immunity will not be granted if the violation oc-
curred based on uncertain or novel law. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 80. 
 134. Id. (“Qualified immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar to constitutional 
tort actions.”). 
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argues that the statute adopted to replace Bivens should not include a quali-
fied immunity provision, but rather, upon a showing by the defendant that 
no violation of clearly established law has occurred, the government should 
replace the agent as the defendant as the suit proceeds.135 
Absent a showing by the agent that the violation was of a novel or ambi-
guous law, as opposed to a clearly established law, the case should move 
forward against the government agent and the plaintiff should be able to re-
cover general damages—including pecuniary,136 non-pecuniary,137 and 
even punitive damages where appropriate.  This allows the total cost of the 
injury to be internalized by the wrongdoer, which creates optimal deter-
rence and, therefore, decreases the number of violations that occur. 
Furthermore, the intentional wrongdoer is the cheapest cost-avoider of 
the violation.138  In most cases, choosing not to intentionally violate clearly 
established constitutional rights is cost-free.139  Thus, efficiency will be 
promoted by placing the costs of violations on the wrongdoer, rather than 
on the victim who would have to purchase loss insurance to protect him-
self, or on the taxpayer who would have to use the democratic system to 
put potentially costly safeguards into place in order to eliminate viola-
tions.140 
Thus, where clearly established law has been violated, efficiency and the 
principles of justice will place the full cost of the violation on the rogue 
government official.141 
 
 135. See infra Part III.B. 
 136. Pecuniary damages include hospital bills, destroyed property, and other calculable 
expenses related to the violation.  For a definition of monetary damages generally, see 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (9th ed. 2010). 
 137. Non-monetary damages include pain and suffering and loss of consortium resulting 
from a violation. See id. 
 138. The cheapest cost-avoider is the party that could avoid the harm at the lowest cost. 
See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1992); see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for 
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 n.19 (1972) (defining the cheapest cost 
avoider as the party who the arbitrary initial cost bearer would find worthwhile to bribe in 
order to obtain a change in behavior that would most lessen the cost of the accident). 
 139. This ignores the cost of lost utility to the would-be rogue government official, which 
comes from denying him the opportunity to violate clearly established law on a subsidized 
basis.  This cost is viewed as insignificant for purposes of this Note. 
 140. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 7 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 8th ed. 2006) (explaining that in order to preserve 
scarce resources, damages are assessed against defendants as a way of measuring the cost of 
the violation, and the main function of liability is thus to bring about the efficient level of 
safety). 
 141. Whether or not general damages should ever be available in terms of efficiency is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  However, because the current system embraces non-
pecuniary damages for tortfeasors in most cases, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffer-
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The next part of this Note discusses situations in which no clearly estab-
lished law has been violated, but a violation nevertheless occurred and the 
victim suffered monetary losses. 
B. Absent a Violation of Clearly Established Law, a Cause of Action 
Against the Government Should Exist for Violations of an Individual’s 
Constitutional Rights 
As opposed to the current system, where the costs of violations of new 
or uncertain laws are imposed on the victims, the statute adopted by Con-
gress should provide a cause of action against the government for pecu-
niary losses suffered as a result of the violation of new or uncertain laws.142  
In fact, if plaintiffs are able to show that their constitutional rights were vi-
olated, and that the violation caused monetary losses or damages, the gov-
ernment should be strictly liable to the plaintiff for those damages.  This 
would shift the cost of violations from the victim to the taxpayer, at least to 
the extent that those losses are quantifiable.  Shifting the cost of violations 
of uncertain law to taxpayers effectively ensures that the cost is shared by 
society rather than concentrated on individual victims.143 
This is also an appropriate response because the government exists for 
the benefit of society as a whole.  The costs related to accidental violations 
of constitutional rights are a cost of having government enforcement of 
laws.  These costs should be paid by all members of society, rather than by 
the relatively small number of unfortunate victims, because all members of 
society are beneficiaries of having an established government.144  Under 
the current system, society is free-riding at the expense of victims by plac-
ing the entire cost of accidental violations upon them. 
Placing the costs of accidental violations on the government has the add-
ed benefit of limiting the chilling effect on government agents caused by 
violations of clearly established law.  This provides a safe haven for discre-
 
ing, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 164, 167 
(2004), government actors who violate constitutional rights should not be immune from lia-
bility for any monetary recovery available to plaintiffs.  This view is contrary to the argu-
ments made in terms of the government in Part III.B of this Note. See infra Part III.B. 
 142. See Hedrick, supra note 81, at 1066 (arguing that an official’s good faith may be 
relevant as to the cause of action against the official personally, but not relevant as to a 
cause of action against the government). 
 143. One of the primary goals of strict liability is to spread the costs of accidental viola-
tions among a broad class of people in order to provide insurance against what would oth-
erwise be a devastating loss for an individual. See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented 
Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 
341, 350 (1996).  Spreading accident costs is thus efficient because the costs cause less so-
cial and economic harm when spread among many people. See id. 
 144. See Pillard, supra note 79, at 82. 
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tionary actions taken by government agents on the basis of new or uncer-
tain law and will not deter them from taking necessary action through fear 
of monetary liability.  Actions that violate clearly established law, however, 
are effectively deterred because of the certainty that liability for the costs of 
that violation will attach to the wrongdoer.145 
In contrast with the availability of general damages to a plaintiff who is 
the victim of a violation of clearly established law, the damages attributable 
to a violation of novel or uncertain law should be limited to the calculable 
pecuniary loss incurred. 
There are several reasons for limiting the damages paid by the govern-
ment to pecuniary damages.  The first reason is that it is not as important, 
for deterrence purposes, that the government pay the full cost of the loss.  
This is because the government does not respond to economic incentives in 
the same manner as individuals and corporations.146  The government re-
sponds to many noneconomic considerations, including public satisfaction 
and approval, special interest group requests, safety and security needs, and 
environmental concerns.147  The government may simply pay judgments 
from the tax pool without changing its behavior because it does not feel 
monetary loss in the same way an individual does.148  Because causing the 
government to internalize the non-pecuniary losses suffered by the victim 
likely would not discourage future violations, there is no deterrence justifi-
cation for covering non-pecuniary losses.  If deterrence of government 
agents were the only consideration, the same analysis would apply to pecu-
niary losses.  Thus, further justification is needed to support limiting the 
damages available to plaintiffs to monetary losses when the government is 
defending this type of action. 
The second factor that must be considered is the nature of plaintiff com-
pensation for non-pecuniary losses.  Professor Richard Abel argues that 
 
 145. Under the current system, uncertainty about the ability of a government agent to in-
demnify the government can have a chilling effect on agents making discretionary decisions 
based on new or uncertain law. See id. at 78.  However, the risk that an individual agent 
“would be left paying [his own] damages is negligible under the current system.” Id. 
 146. See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect 
of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 846 (2001) (discussing the unique 
problems associated with determining how government incentives function, including the 
fact that some sort of political capital might be exchanged or valued rather than money). 
 147. See id. at 849 (acknowledging that the government responds to political rather than 
economic incentives). 
 148. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics and the Alloca-
tion of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 353 (2000).  For a different approach to 
the issue, see Gilles, supra note 146, at 859-67 (describing the “other important reasons why 
we should reasonably expect government to respond to the imposition of constitutional tort 
damage remedies”). 
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non-pecuniary losses are incoherent, incalculable, and incommensurable,149 
and thus are not losses which should be covered by the government.150  
While Professor Abel’s characterization of non-pecuniary losses as incohe-
rent, incalculable, and incommensurate151 may be somewhat extreme, his 
characterization of the fundamental problem as one of calculation is accu-
rate.  That is, even if non-pecuniary damages could be calculated, the cost 
of doing so accurately would be prohibitively expensive in an already inef-
ficient tort system,152 and the question would remain—how much money 
effectively compensates victims for abstract losses like pain and suffer-
ing?153 
The goal of awarding damages in tort law is to “return the plaintiff as 
closely as possible to his or her condition before the accident.”154  In terms 
of non-monetary damages, however, plaintiffs cannot be returned to their 
pre-accident status.  Plaintiffs cannot “unfeel” their pain and suffering; they 
cannot replace the relationships lost by the wrongful deaths of loved ones.  
Money cannot necessarily approximate the value of being free from these 
losses in a meaningful way.155  Because of the impossibility of equating 
monetary damages with non-monetary losses, damages for these losses 
would not be available to plaintiffs who bring causes of action against the 
government for violations of constitutional rights.  Although this system 
would force the victims to internalize the losses related to non-pecuniary 
damages, these losses could not be compensated with money.156 
The third reason for limiting government liability to pecuniary damages 
is to protect taxpayers from paying for non-pecuniary losses that are not ef-
fectively compensated by money.  Because juries are sympathetic to the 
victims of these types of violations, it is possible that juries would award 
large sums of money for pain and suffering even though the dollar amount 
 
 149. See generally Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, In-
commensurable, and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 
(2006). 
 150. Professor Abel argues that the tort system should not be in the business of covering 
general non-pecuniary losses at all, and does not limit his argument to the government as 
this Note does. See id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. at 294-95 (discussing all of the potential complexities of calculating non-
pecuniary damages). 
 153. See id. at 291. 
 154. Id. at 258. 
 155. Id. at 259 (“‘No one likes pain and suffering and most people would pay a good deal 
of money to be free of them.’  But giving victims money does not free them from pain.” 
(quoting Kwasny v. United States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987))). 
 156. See id. at 268 (noting that “money cannot buy nonexistence”). 
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is arbitrary in relation to the loss.157  There is also the risk that money com-
ing from the government tax pool would be viewed by the jury as “Mono-
poly Money,” causing them to award significant damages without consider-
ing the opportunity costs of such awards.158  In order to protect the tax pool 
and government resources, the statute should not attempt to provide finan-
cial redress for non-pecuniary losses, which by definition cannot be com-
pensated with money. 
Although this system forces the victim to internalize the entire loss attri-
butable to pain and suffering, society has the ability to effectively mitigate 
this loss by paying pecuniary damages.  Any monetary payment for pain 
and suffering would simply shift wealth from society’s tax pool to the vic-
tim without granting meaningful relief.  Because the goal is to find a sys-
tem that effectively compensates victims while still maximizing efficiency 
in the allocation of scarce resources in the tax pool, a statute replacing Bi-
vens should exempt the government from covering non-pecuniary losses 
caused by violations of new or uncertain constitutional rights. 
Finally, under the suggested statute, if a violation of a new or unclear 
law were to occur without causing monetary harm, the victim would be left 
without a cause of action.  Although at first glance this might seem unde-
sirable, the arguments for excluding non-monetary damages also apply to a 
scenario without identifiable monetary losses.  The fact that there would be 
no available cause of action does not mean that the victim of the violation 
was not harmed; it simply means that society is willing to accept the small 
probability of being the uncompensated victim because the costs that would 
be imposed by an alternative system are greater than the benefits. 
C. Flat Non-Pecuniary Damage Award Option 
For political or other noneconomic reasons, a statute that does not pro-
vide monetary damages for non-pecuniary losses might be viewed by some 
as unacceptable and unadoptable.  The next best alternative would be to cap 
non-pecuniary damages at a relatively small dollar amount.159  This system 
has the benefit of acknowledging the victims’ losses without giving juries 
the discretion to award large damage amounts for noneconomic losses from 
the tax pool.  The goal of awarding these damages would be to give sym-
bolic compensation to victims who suffer emotional or other noneconomic 
 
 157. Id. at 291-93. 
 158. The opportunity cost here would be all of the other uses that this tax money could go 
toward if it did not go toward compensation for non-pecuniary losses. 
 159. If extinguishing non-pecuniary awards for these types of cases is politically imposs-
ible or socially undesirable, awards for emotional losses should be capped at a relatively low 
figure in order to preserve scarce government resources. 
GEPHART_CHRISTENSEN 10/13/2010  6:53 PM 
2010] A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 1081 
losses, as well as to extend causes of action to victims of violations who do 
not suffer quantifiable monetary harms. 
Further, the opportunity to recover damages up to the capped amount 
would be an incentive for victims who suffer no economic damage but do 
suffer emotional harm to bring suit.  Giving victims a small award would 
acknowledge that they were harmed by government action and may also 
help them cope with the violation.  While it is not customary to receive 
apologies in our legal system, providing a small damages award may be the 
only way a victim’s strictly noneconomic harm could be recognized. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent decisions suggest that, absent a congressional statute creating a 
cause of action for violations of constitutional rights by federal officials, 
the Court will continue to limit the Bivens doctrine.160  Iqbal illustrates that 
the Court views the application of Bivens as discretionary, rather than de-
serving strict stare decisis deference.161  Further, the application of the 
Twombly pleading standard to Bivens cases, as dictated by Iqbal, further 
chips away at the Bivens cause of action, limiting plaintiffs’ ability to move 
forward with discovery, and ultimately their ability to succeed on a 
claim.162 
In order to ensure that plaintiffs are afforded a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain relief, Congress should adopt an efficient statute to replace Bivens.  
An efficient version of that statute would deter rogue individual govern-
ment officials by holding them liable for violations of clearly established 
law.  On the other hand, where there was uncertainty about the law, and the 
government official executed his duties in good faith, the costs of any dam-
ages and litigation expenses would shift to the government.  The adoption 
of a statute to replace Bivens would ensure that a cause of action allowing 
victims to recover damages for violations of their constitutional rights will 
no longer depend on the Supreme Court’s view of its power to create such 
actions. 
 
 160. See supra Part I.B. 
 161. See The Bivens Dicta, supra note 47. 
 162. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
